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Why Primary Patents Covering Biologics Should
Be Unenforceable Against Generic Applicants
Under the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act
Yaniv Helecf
I.

BACKGROUND

On March 21, 2010, as part of the healthcare reform, Congress passed
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 ("BPCIA").
BPCIA amends section 351 of the Public Health Services Act,2 the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"),3 and several sections under Title
35 of U.S. Code ("Patent Act"4), creating a regulatory pathway for the
licensing of biological products as "biosimilar to" 5 and/or "interchangeable
with"6 an already approved biological product ("reference product"). 8
Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law; J.S.D. 2011 Columbia Law
School; LL.M. 2004 Columbia Law School; LL.B. 2000 Tel Aviv University;
Undergraduate Diploma in Biology 2000 Tel Aviv University. This article is an abridged
and shortened version of my article Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological
Pharmaceuticals-Do We Really Need Both?, 18 Mich. Telecom. & Tech. L. Rev.
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Heled]. I wish to thank my wife, Danielle Gordon Heled, my first
and last reader.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. Nos. 111-148 & 111-152, §§
7001-7003 (2010) (passing the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 that
amended § 351 of the Public Health Services Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §262) [hereinafter
PPACA].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2011) [hereinafter BPCIA].
3. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2011) [hereinafter
FFDCA].
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2011).
5. Under BPCIA, the term 'biosimilar' or 'biosimilarity' means that "the biological
product is highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in
clinically inactive components" and that "there are no clinically meaningful differences
between the biological product and the [original] product in terms of the safety, purity, and
potency of the product." BPCIA, supra note 2, § 262(i)(2) (2011).
6. Under BPCIA, the term 'interchangeable' or 'interchangeability' means that "the
biological product may be substituted for the reference product without the intervention of
the health care provider who prescribed the reference product." BPCIA, supra note 2, §
262(i)(3) (2011).
7. Under BPCIA, the term 'reference product' means the single biological product
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Once a biological product is deemed "interchangeable with" a reference
product, under BPCIA it may be substituted for the reference product
without the intervention of the healthcare provider who prescribed the
reference product.'
BPCIA sets a twelve-year market exclusivity period in original
biologicso and a four-year data exclusivity period for the data submitted in
support of the application for the original biologic." BPCIA also provides
for a possible extension of the twelve-year market exclusivity and four-year
data exclusivity periods by an additional six-month period for having the
biological product tested and approved for use in pediatric populations.12
Thus, BPCIA creates market exclusivity periods in original biological
products of up to 12 2 years and data exclusivity periods of up to 4 2
years.
The exclusivity period is intended to run in parallel and in addition to
any patents that may apply to such approved biological pharmaceutical
products, which would also grant the developers of these products
monopolies in the underlying technologies on which such products are
based. This seeming redundancy raises questions regarding the need and
justification for having patent protection on biologics in addition to
statutory exclusivities.
The idea of providing developers of biologics with statutory exclusivity
in their products originated from the perception that patents alone are
insufficient for protecting proprietary interests in biological products, for
several reasons. First, biologics are subject to especially high barriers to
patentability that do not exist in other areas of technology. Second, due to
the "product of nature" doctrine and heightened written description, best
mode, enablement, and utility requirements pertaining to biologics, there
are various types of biologics for which patentability is limited or uncertain.
Third, the complexity of biologics and the processes of making them lend
themselves to potential variations, which could be used for "designingaround" patent claim limitations covering such compounds and their
manufacturing processes. This tension is further exacerbated by the
licensed under PHSA § 351(a) against which a generic biological product is evaluated in an
application submitted under BPCIA. See BPCIA, supra note 2, § 262(i)(4) (2011).
8. PPACA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262).
9. Id. § 7002(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3)).
10. Id. § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A)). Under BPCIA, during this
period, the FDA may not make effective the approval of applications for biosimilar and/or
interchangeable products until the date that is 12 years after the date on which the reference
product was first licensed by the FDA.
11. Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B)). Under BPCIA, during this period,
generic applicants may not submit applications for the approval of their versions of biologics
biosimilar to original biological products.
12. Id. § 7002(g) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(m)).
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uncertainty surrounding the application of the doctrine of equivalents to this
relatively new area of technology. And fourth, for many biologics, one of
the most difficult and important aspects of bringing the product to the
market is the development of manufacturing know-how, which is especially
difficult to protect under patent law.
Combined with the already increased likelihood of patent challenges that
characterize the area of pharmaceuticals in recent years, industry
representatives have argued that they cannot rely on patents to protect the
proprietary interests of developers of biological products, which may in turn
result in curbing of research and development ("R&D"). FDA-granted
statutory exclusivities on the other hand, whether data or market
exclusivity, are obtained and enforced automatically, as a by-product of the
FDA approval proceedings, and their practice does not require their
beneficiary to take any specific action. Also, statutory exclusivities do not
lend themselves to the skirmishes that characterize patent infringement
disputes. Rather, in dispute situations statutory exclusivities provide a
relatively predictable outcome, which represents not only significant cost
savings but also minimization of investors' risks, thereby creating a
business environment favorable to investment in R&D.
Interestingly, while the underlying rationales for market exclusivity
under BPCIA and the five-year New Chemical Entity ("NCE") statutory
exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act (on which the BPCIA market
exclusivity is modeled) are similar, their function/"mechanism of action" is
different. In both cases, the intention was to provide developers of
pharmaceutical products with sufficient incentives to invest in R&D.
However, the five-year NCE statutory exclusivity was meant to work its
effect where no incentives existed from a patent perspective (e.g. where the
drug product contains a well known active compound that is not patentable)
whereas the 12 to 12 V2 year market exclusivity under BPCIA appears to
have been devised as a "fallback" option to patents, namely, as "insurance"
in case they fail. In other words, market exclusivity under BPCIA is meant
to provide an "iron-clad, litigation-proof' protection of the interests of
developers of biological products in case their patents fall short. Viewed in
this light, in the context of biologics, statutory exclusivities are sometimes
referred to as "insurance policies" meant to protect the interests of
developers of biological products where patents might fail in doing so.
II.

How PATENT TERM COMPARES WITH THE PERIOD OF MARKET
EXCLUSIVITY UNDER BPCIA

The R&D and approval of biologics, from the first synthesizing of the
biologic or a closely related compound through the approval of the biologic
license application ("BLA") by the FDA typically takes over a decade. A
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rough estimate of a typical timeline for the development of a biological
product consists of about four to five years of preclinical studies, six to nine
years dedicated to clinical trials prior to the submission of a BLA and
another twelve to sixteen months for the FDA to process and decide on the
BLA. In sum, the development of a biological product typically takes about
11 to 15 2years. 13
Based on the abovementioned timeframes and in view of the fact that the
statutory exclusivities in biologics would only "kick in" upon FDA
approval, BPCIA effectively dictates that (1) manufacturers of generic
versions of biologics would only be able to file applications for generic
versions of biologics after fifteen to twenty years from the inception of
development of the original biological product, 14 and (2) the FDA may only
approve such applications after twenty-three to twenty-eight years from the
inception of development of the original biologic."
Viewing the abovementioned timeframes from a patent perspective, it is
important to acknowledge several additional milestones. First, biologics
may be, and often are, the subject of numerous patents that may cover (1)
specific biological compounds, their precursors, possible metabolites and
other derivatives, (2) processes of making these compounds, (3)
formulations containing the compounds, and (4) methods of using the
biological compound in the treatment of illnesses. Since the natural course
of development of most biologics first involves the identification, making,
and isolation of a biologic having therapeutic properties (not necessarily in
that order), the first patent applications commonly seek to claim the
biological active compound (a.k.a. active pharmaceutical ingredient or
API), closely related compounds and methods of making them and are filed
very early in the development process, typically between the time
immediately after the identification of the biological API and right before
the beginning of clinical trials in human subjects. In other words, if the
beginning of the R&D efforts is marked as the "0" time-point and clinical
trials normally begin after four to five years of preclinical studies, then the
filing of the first patent application pertaining to the biological product
would normally occur between "development years" one and four to five
(depending on the length of the preclinical trials stage). 16
13. This calculation is based on adding the estimated four to five years of preclinical
studies, six to nine years of clinical trials and 1 to 1 1/3 years it takes for the FDA to approve
BLAs and then rounding the result (11 to 15 '/3 years) to the closest half-year increment.
14. This calculation is based on adding the estimated 11 to 15 V2years it takes to put a
typical biologic on the market to the 4 to 4 V2years of data exclusivity under BPCIA.
15. This calculation is based on adding the estimated 11 to 15 V2years it takes to put a
biologic on the market to the 12 to 12 V2years of market exclusivity under BPCIA.
16. Notably, the first patent application is not necessarily the first submission to the
USPTO, which is frequently of a provisional application containing little more than
preliminary data and a rudimentary concept of the invention and whose purpose is merely to
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Patents generally expire twenty years from the filing date of the original
application.' 7 Thus, as a general proposition, the primary patents - namely,
patent issued from one of the first patent applications to be filed early in the
R&D of the biological product and covering, typically, the biological API
itself (often as a purified, isolated compound), its manufacturing and/or the
first known methods of using it - would be set to expire between
"development years" twenty-one to twenty-five, whereas the market
exclusivity period pertaining to the products covered by these patents would
expire around "development years" twenty-three to twenty-eight.
However, when comparing the term of statutory exclusivities to the term
of primary patents it is necessary to take into account patent term
extensions available to one patent per FDA-approved product." If we make
the most patent-term-favorable assumptions that virtually all first primary
patents (i.e. the first primary patent to issue for any given biological
product) would merit an extension of four to five years,' 9 then it is possible
to argue that for any biological product there would be one patent whose
term would be extended 1 '2 to 2 years beyond the expiration of the 12 to
12 2 year market exclusivity period. 2 0 Thus, while generally primary
patents covering biological products would expire within twenty-one to
twenty-five years following the onset of development, under the above
patent-term-favorable assumptions, one of the primary patents would expire
within about twenty-five to thirty years from that date. 2' However, in
"buy" the inventors another year for further development of their invention. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 111(b), 119(e) (2011).
17. See 35 U.S.C § 154 (2011).
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(a)(4), 156(c), 156(f)(2)(A), 156(g)(1), 156(g)(6) (2011); 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(i) (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) (2011). Under these sections, the term of patents
pertaining to biological products "shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory
review period for the approved product" up to a total period of 14 years from the date of
approval of the biological product but not exceeding 5 years, whereas the "regulatory review
period" is calculated as half the time in which the product was in clinical trials, plus the
period it took the FDA to review and approve the BLA.
19. Given the length of clinical trials of biologics and the average 12 to 16 months
needed for FDA review of BLAs, it is prudent to assume that the majority of biological
products would merit the maximum patent term extension of half the clinical trials' period
plus the time needed for FDA review of the application up to a maximum of five years.
Basing the calculation on the estimated times herein, the term extension could be roughly
estimated as equal to '2 of six to nine years plus 1 to I /3 years, namely 4 to 5.83 years.
Given the upper limit of five years, a typical patent term extension period would be four to
five years.
20. Since under 35 U.S.C. § 156 patent term extension cannot extend the patent term
beyond fourteen years from the date of FDA approval of the product and the statutory
market exclusivity under BPCIA extends for 12 to 12 '2 years from that date, then, arguably,
no patent term could be extended more than two years beyond the expiration of a twelveyear market exclusivity or 1 2 years beyond the expiration of a 12 2 year market
exclusivity.
21. This calculation is based on adding the estimated four to five years of patent term
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reality not all primary patents are entitled to a patent term extension, as in
some instances the term of primary patents already extends beyond fourteen
years from the date of FDA-approval. Thus, even with patent term
extension, extended primary patents are expected to expire, on average,
about five to eleven months subsequent to the expiration of the 12 to 12 V2
year market exclusivity period under BPCIA.22
Thus, arguably, based on the above calculations, the market exclusivity
period under BPCIA would keep competition out of biologic markets, on
average, for five to eleven months less than the average monopoly period
afforded by primary patents on inventions pertaining to the biological
product.
III.

WHY HAVING CONCURRENT PROTECTION UNDER BOTH PATENTS

AND STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITIEs REGIMES ISNOT ONLY UNNECESSARY

BUT ISALSO BAD PUBLIC POLICY
Comparing the rationales for granting statutory exclusivities with patent
theory, it appears that the reasoning behind both types of monopoly is quite
similar, if not identical, especially in the context of biologics. In a nutshell,
the incentive-to-disclose and incentive-to-invent/invest patent theories
emphasize patents' functional role of incentivizing the disclosure of
existing inventions and the pursuit of further R&D activities leading to
more inventions. The rationales for granting statutory exclusivities are very
similar; the purpose of statutory exclusivities in the context of
pharmaceuticals is to provide assurance that developers of original
biologics are able to reap the fruits of their investment, thereby ensuring the
existence of sufficient incentive-to-invent/invest. Accordingly, at least
from a functional perspective, in the context of biologics, both patents and
statutory exclusivities seek to achieve the same purpose and incentivize
essentially the same behavior by inventors, investors and developers.
However, it appears that affording protection under both patent and
statutory exclusivities regimes while both of them are in effect is likely to
have undesirable ramifications. First, concurrent protection by both patents
and statutory exclusivities would likely lead to a waste of societal
extension to the 21 to 25 years patent term from the inception of development. The
calculation would be slightly different if we were to add 1 2 to two years to the statutory
exclusivity period of 23 to 28 years, resulting in a similar patent term extending 25 to 29 1/2
years from the beginning of development.
22. See Heled, supra note *, at Table 1. This period of five to eleven months is based on
the average period of time between the term of earliest filed primary patents pertaining to
seventy-nine biological products for which primary patents could be identified (excluding
insulin and human growth hormone ("hGH") products) and the hypothetical dates in which
the market exclusivity in these products would have expired had these products been subject
to BPCIA. I refrained from making any assumptions regarding the potential addition of V2
year of market exclusivity for experimentation in pediatric populations.
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resources. The enforcement of patents is an expensive prospect not only for
the individual parties involved but also for society at large. Patent systems
require substantial investment in education and training necessary to
enforce patents. Moreover, maintaining the numerous elements of a patent
system dedicated to resolving disputes requires a significant ongoing
investment of societal resources.23 Thus, the investment of resources in the
enforcement of patent rights where statutory exclusivities already cover
biological products would constitute a waste of the relative portion of
societal resources (out of the entire societal investment in maintaining and
administering a patent system), which is necessary to facilitate such
enforcement.24 Notably, the social cost of having both patent protection and
statutory exclusivities available to biologics is going to be even further
exacerbated by the highly complicated and elaborate framework for the
resolution of patent disputes arising out of the filing of an application for
biosimilar products under BPCLA. This framework would require potential
adversaries to obtain extensive legal counseling 25 and, possibly, litigate
numerous patent disputes in several different legal arenas over a prolonged
period of time.26
Second, affording patent protection for biological products in parallel to
FDA-instituted exclusivities would likely increase the risk of occurrences of
abuse by developers of biological products in a variety of ways which
would almost inevitably diminish public access to biological products. Yet,
while BPCIA thoughtfully accounts for the risk of abuse of statutory
exclusivities by specifically and explicitly disallowing grants of market and
data exclusivities under certain circumstances,2 7 patent law does not seem to
23. Notably, the administration of the patent dispute resolution scheme established in
BPCIA would require even further investment of societal resources such as those described
herein.
24. To clarify: the argument here is not that the entire societal investment of resources in
the creation and maintenance of a patent system constitutes waste, but rather that the relative
portion of such an investment which is necessary to support the handling of patent disputes
as they pertain to biological products which are already being covered by statutory
exclusivities under BPCIA would be wasteful.
25. See PPACAsupra note 1, § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(l)(2)-262(l)(4)).
26. See id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(7)(B), 262(l)(6), 262(l)(8) and 262(l)(9)).
27. See id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(7)(C)(i)) (stipulates that applications for the
approval of biologics that are "supplements" to an original BLA cannot re-trigger the market
and data exclusivity provisions); Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(I))
(Determines that applications filed by the same manufacturer or its "licensor, predecessor in
interest, or other related entity" would not merit data or market exclusivity if the application
is merely for a "modification to the structure of the biological product that does not result in
a change in safety, purity, or potency."); Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii)(II)) (an
application filed by the same manufacturer for a non-structural change of the biologic and
"that results in a new indication, route of administration, dosing schedule, dosage form,
delivery system, delivery device, or strength" would, similarly, not award the manufacturer
with an exclusivity period on top of that already awarded for the original biological product).
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have the same kind of safeguards against abuse and remains relatively
susceptible to it. Thus, protecting biological products under patent law in
addition to the statutory exclusivities framework available under BPCIA
would create an opening for abuses of the patent system that would delay
the entry of generic biologics into the market.
Accordingly, it would be preferable that any particular biological product
be subject to protection under either the BPCIA instituted statutory
exclusivities regime or patents covering the underlying inventions
pertaining to the biological product. In the context of biologics, statutory
exclusivities have numerous advantages over patents. As discussed earlier,
at least in the context of biologics, patents are a cumbersome, inefficient
and often ineffective way of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."28 FDA granted statutory exclusivities, on the other hand,
appear to be more comprehensive and easily enforceable, would
significantly reduce costs involved in litigation, are less prone to abuse and
would create legal certainty that is currently missing from the protection of
technological innovation under patent law.
Furthermore, statutory exclusivities guarantee that only "worthy
technologies" are granted monopolies. While the patent system utilizes an
array of "surrogate" or "proxy" - arguably irrelevant - standards to
indirectly appraise the societal value of advancements, including biological
products,29 the FDA's expertise and understanding in the area of biologics
enables it to evaluate the potential medical benefits of biologics and weigh
them against possible risks, thereby directly determining the true societal
value of specific biological products. Thus, at least in the context of
biologics, a statutory exclusivities regime has an economic advantage over
a patent regime, as it is more likely to guarantee that monopolies are only
awarded for "socially valuable" technologies.
IV.

PROPOSAL: MAKING PRIMARY PATENTS UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST
GENERIC APPLICANTS UNDER BPCIA

To avoid the negative ramifications of concurrent protection by both
statutory exclusivities and patents, it is advisable that upon the onset of the
statutory exclusivity period under BPCIA developers of the approved
products would no longer be able to enforce their patents as they pertain to
Notably, by not affording additional statutory exclusivity for approval of additional
indications of the same biological product, the statutory exclusivity scheme created by
BPCIA differs from that of the Hatch-Waxman Act in that BPCIA does not incentivize
additional clinical research leading to the approval of the same biologic for the treatment of
additional medical conditions.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8.
29. E.g. novelty, nonobviousness, written description, enablement, and more. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 101 etseq.
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the biological product as approved against generic manufacturers3 0 applying
for the approval of generic versions of such products ("proposed
amendment"). 31
Importantly, this proposal would strip biological products of any
additional period of protection under their primary patents subsequent to the
expiration of the market exclusivity under BPCIA. The potential loss of
this additional protection under patent law (with all of its shortcomings) is
justified because it reflects payment for insurance embodied in the statutory
exclusivities afforded under BPCIA. In other words, developers of original
biological products would surrender about five to eleven months on average
of exclusivity under patent law in return for 12 to 12 V2 years of litigationfree market exclusivity (and 4 to 4 /2years of data exclusivity).
Further, making it impossible for developers of original biological
products to enforce their primary patents against generic applicants filing
for generic versions of biological products under BPCIA would prevent
developers from "double dipping." Arguably, the length of the market
exclusivity period granted under BPCIA should be sufficient to incentivize
R&D in the area of biological pharmaceuticals.32 There is no justification
30. Importantly, this amendment is not meant to prevent developers of biological
products from enforcing their patents against later applicants seeking approval not under
BPCIA. Namely, under no circumstances would developers of biological products be unable
to sue for infringement of their patents where a competitor might seek FDA approval of the
same biological compound for the treatment of the same medical condition by conducting
their own clinical trials, i.e. without relying on the approval of the original biological product
under BPCIA.
31. One way of achieving this result would be to amend Title 35 of the U.S. Code to
limit section 271 so that it would create causes of action against generic applicants under
BPCIA only if no statutory exclusivity under BPCIA is in effect with relation to the product
covered by the patent whose enforcement is sought. A possible "softer" version of such a
sweeping prohibition of enforcement of pertinent patents is to have developers of biological
products elect how to protect their proprietary interests in their products, namely by choosing
to benefit from the statutory exclusivities scheme afforded under BPCIA or having the
ability to enforce their patents covering the underlying technologies in the approved
biological product against generic applicants. To implement this "softer" version of the
proposed amendment, BPCIA could be amended to stipulate that the FDA would refrain
from taking the actions related to the approval of generic versions of the biological products
as prescribed under PPACA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)) only pursuant to a
commitment by a BLA applicant to be estopped from enforcing its patents pertaining to the
approved biological product against such generic applicants and/or so long as developers of
biological products do not seek enforcement of their patents covering inventions pertaining
to their biological products against parties seeking approval for generic versions of such
product in accordance with BPCIA. This "softer" version may circumvent possible
challenges of the proposed amendment as an unconstitutional taking of one's proprietary
rights in its patents in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
32. The reoccurrence of a twelve-year period in many of the proposals has not been
coincidental. Rather, it was the result of a perception that "the effective patent life for
pharmaceuticals-the time remaining following FDA approval-is approximately eleven to
twelve years." See FED. TRADE COMM'N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON
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for "windfalls" in the form of additional monopoly periods conferred by
primary patents extending beyond the end of the market exclusivity period
in some of the biological products that would further curb public access to
these products.
Yet, the proposed amendment is unlikely to discourage continued R&D
of approved biological products (which is intended to lead to improvements
of approved biological products and, possibly, to the development of new
ones). This is because the proposed amendment would only apply to
patents that cover biological products as originally approved by the FDA.
To avoid unnecessary legal disputes there may also be merit in explicitly
limiting the proposed amendment so that it would only apply to primary
patents and would not prevent enforcement of secondary patents covering
inventions stemming from continued R&D. Such explicit limitation, while
potentially opening the door to litigation involving secondary patents (with
all of its risks of evergreening and patent abuse), would assist in providing
the necessary incentive for continued R&D of already-approved biologics,
which is currently missing from BPCIA. An alternative solution to the
problem of lack of incentive for continued R&D of already-approved
biological products would be to amend BPCIA so as to allow for an
additional short period of market exclusivity for the approval of additional
medical indications for already-approved biological products.
V. WHY (AND WHEN) WE STILL NEED PATENTS TO INCENTIVIZE
INNOVATION INTHE AREA OF BIOLOGICAL PHARMACEUTICALS

Despite the clear advantages statutory exclusivities have over patents and
their numerous shortcomings as means of incentivizing R&D in the area of
biologics, patents still have important functions to fulfill during the period
prior to the approval of biological products by the FDA. Thanks to their
ability to prevent situations of "races to register," 34 patents serve an
important fundraising function, which enables R&D entities to raise the
BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION vi-vii (2009) ("[t]he economic model put forth by pioneer

drug manufacturers to justify [a twelve to fourteen year exclusivity period] is based on the
average time required to recoup the investment to develop and commercialize a typical
biologic drug"). Thus, an exclusivity period of about twelve years would presumably
provide developers of original biologics with the assurance that the return on their
investment would justify the time, money, and effort they expended in developing their
products.
33. Importantly, primary patents covering biological products (which would, under the
proposal herein, be unenforceable against generic manufacturers seeking approval of their
products under BPCIA) would still be enforceable against independent developers of the
same biological product and third parties who do not seek to utilize the BPCIA framework
and who would therefore not be subject to BPCIA's statutory exclusivities provisions.
34. A "race to register" occurs when two companies undertake a similar research project
and are competing to have their respective products approved by the FDA first.
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funds necessary to support their research projects. In this respect patents
have a vital function in the development of pharmaceutical products and,
even more so, of biological products as they make it possible for developers
of such products to raise the funds necessary to traverse the various,
numerous expensive steps of clinical development prior to being eligible to
benefit from the statutory exclusivities under BPCIA (subsequent to
approval of the biological product by the FDA). Accordingly, during the
period prior to approval of biological products by the FDA and the onset of
statutory exclusivities under BPCIA, patents would actually serve as
"insurance policies" that would make the achievement of statutory
exclusivities possible further down the road.
In addition, as discussed earlier, follow-on patents would also still have
an important role to play in incentivizing continued R&D of biological
products past the point of "sufficiency of research" for the purpose of
approval by the FDA as such R&D would, presumably, result in patents
that would expire subsequent to the expiration of statutory exclusivity
periods under BPCIA.
To summarize: there is merit in affording biological products sequential
(rather than concurrent) protection from (1) any primary patents pertaining
to the underlying technology in such products prior to the onset of statutory
exclusivities under BPCIA, (2) statutory exclusivities in the FDA approved
products themselves and (3) any secondary patents pertaining to substantial
further developments of the originally approved biological product.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The most important function of patents and statutory exclusivities alike is
to ensure that those partaking in technological R&D would not only survive
to continue their activity, but would also prosper and seek to continue their
R&D activities in the future. However, at least in the field of biologics,
patents might not serve this purpose as well as statutory exclusivities
would. The statutory exclusivities afforded under BPCIA have been
tailored to the needs of developers of biological products in the context of
generic competition and should thus be held as sufficient for
accommodating those needs. Allowing developers of biological products to
benefit from the protection of primary patents alongside and concurrent
with such statutory exclusivities would cause waste and could lead to abuse
of the patent system. A substitution of primary patent enforcement rights
against generic competition where statutory exclusivities in FDA-approved
biological products are in force is the best means to incentivize continued
investment in R&D while guaranteeing sufficient public access to generic
versions of biological products.
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